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RECENT DECISIONS
damages. This was amended in 194921 to expressly exclude the cove-
rage of timber trespass.
Thus the legislature indicated its disfavor toward lenient treat-
ment of timber trespassers by the enactment of section 331.18 in 1873.
The awareness one the part of the legislature in 1873 that bad faith
is normally considered an element in the recovery of enhanced damages
is expressly shown by the provision for an affidavit of mistake. By
the abolishment of section 331.18, the amendment to 331.17, and the
important change from the term "wilful" to "unlawful" in section
26.09 it can be logically concluded that the legislature intended that
the rule of double damage should be applied to all cases of timber
trespass, whether done wilfully or by mistake.
GEORGE RADLER
Administrative Law-Jurisdiction of Courts in Railway Wrong-
ful Discharge Cases Under Collective Bargaining Agreements-
Plaintiff for many years was employed by the defendant railway
company in its Wisconsin Law Department in the City of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, as a stenographer-typist and clerk. In August, 1947, the
plaintiff was discharged allegedly in violation of a collective bargain-
ing contract which was in force at that time between the defendant
and the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship, Freight Handlers,
Express and Station Employees. An action was commenced in the
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin in which plaintiff, after alleging certain items of damage,
demanded judgment for $6,000.00 and for a decree reinstating her to
her former position with her seniority, pension, vacation and pass
rights unimpaired. The District Court conducted a hearing on the
issues of (1) whether the plaintiff was covered by the contract or
was expressly excluded and (2) whether the court has jurisdiction
over the matter. The court concluded that the plaintiff's position "was
excluded" by the contract and, second, that the matter was "not pro-
perly before this court, and should have been brought before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board because it involves a grievance
and dispute arising under a bargaining agreement." The District Court
therefore dismissed the complaint on the merits. Plaintiff appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and filed
a motion that oral argument limited to the question of the jurisdiction
of the District Court be held in advance of a hearing on the merits,
which motion was granted. Thus, the appeal presented the question
of whether or not the District Court had jurisdiction to pass on a
question of the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
21 Ch. 252, Wis. Session Laws (1949).
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between a railroad and one of the brotherhoods when the validity of
the contract was not in question. Held: It did not have such jurisdic-
tion and therefore was in error in deciding the case on its merits. The
District Court was directed to dismiss the complaint for lack of juris-
diction. Walters v. Chicago and North Western Railway Company,
216 F. 2d 332 (1954).
In treating of a question of this sort in the area of administrative
law, it is necessary to distinguish between primary jurisdiction and
questions of exhaustion and ripeness. Exhaustion and ripeness relate
to the principles which determine whether a court has jurisdiction
on appeal from an administrative board's decision while primary
jurisdiction relates to the principles which determine whether the
court or an administrative tribunal should make the initial decision.1
The label exhaustion is sometimes used in decisions concerning pri-
mary jurisdiction. Thus, when the appellate court in the instant case
refers to necessity for exhaustion, it evidently means that judicial
jurisdiction is not primary. The question, then, is whether or not the
district court had primary jurisdiction.
The Railway Labor Act2 itself makes no explicit provision con-
cerning common law jurisdiction of courts to interpret and apply
collective bargaining agreements. So, whether an employee who is
complaining against his employer railroad under such an agreement
can initiate proceedings in either a state or federal court without
having first applied to the National Railroad Adjustment Board de-
pends upon the interpretation that is given to Section 153 (i) of the
Railway Labor Act.
"The disputes between an employee or group of employees
and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending
and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual
manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the
carrier designated to handle such disputes; but failing to reach
such an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred
by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate
division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the
facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes."3
(Emphasis added)
The first significant case interpreting this provision was Moore
v. Illinois Central R. Co.,4 which serves as an ideal benchmark in
probing the evolution of the law in this area.
2 DAVIs, ADMINsTRATVE LAW, §197, p. 664 (1951).
245 U.S.C.A. 151 et.seq.
3 Ibid.




This was an action by an employer against the Illinois Central to
recover damages for wrongful discharge. In answering the contention
of the railroad that the district court did not have jurisdiction and that
the proper forum was the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
"But we find nothing in that Act [Railway Labor Act] which
purports to take away from the courts the jurisdiction to de-
termine a controversy over a wrongful discharge or to make
an administrative finding a prerequisite to filing a suit in
court." 5
There followed the case of Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitneye
in which the court stated that the courts should give the Adjustment
Board the first opportunity for the interpretation of the contract. It
should be noted that the case involved only a petition for an injunction
and asked for no relief at law. However after this decision, the
belief was not uncommon that the Moore case had been overruled,
at least in principle. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit that decided the instant case had so held in Starke v. N.Y.,
Chi., & St. Louis Railroad Co.7
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the Slocums case, the next
significant decision in the area, to substantiate its position in the
instant case. The Court said that the plaintiff's complaint brought
her "clearly within the Slocum case rather than within the facts of
the Moore case."9
However this does not decide the important question raised in 1951
by the Newman case.' 0 Simply stated it is this:
Does the Slocum case operate to deprive the federal courts of
jurisdiction in a case involving a decree of reinstatement or was
its scope intended to be limited only to cases where the future
relations between the railroad and its other employers would
be affected?
The Newmarn" case left the question undecided. The facts of the
Slocuin12 case and the action involved are clearly distinguishable from
the instant case. Slocum"3 involved a dispute between two unions
which had separate collective bargaining agreements with the em-
ployer railroad, each claiming for its members certain jobs with the
5 Ibid.6 Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 65 S.Ct. 1566, 89 L.Ed.
1970 (1946).
, Starke v. N.Y., Chi., & St. L. R. Co., 180 F.2d 569 (1950).
8 Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 244, 70 S.Ct. 577, 580 (1950).
9 Walters v. Chi. & N. W. R. Co., 216 F.2d 332 (1954).
10 Newman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 191 F.2d 560 (1951).




railroad. The railroad filed a declaratory judgment action in a state
court naming both unions as defendants. The state court interpreted
the agreements and entered a declaratory judgment which was af-
firmed by the New York Court of Appeals. 4 On appeal it was held
by the U. S. Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the Railway Ad-
justment Board was exclusive and the state court erred in interpre-
ting the agreements. 15.
It is immediately apparent that the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreements by the state court affected future relations
between the railroad and its other employees and therefore the in-
terpretation should have been made by the Adjustment Board.
In the instant case, however, such future relations would not be
affected, and thus, whether the Slocum'6 case should control is open
to serious doubt.
The Court in the Slocum case expressly stated:
"Our holding here is not inconsistent with our holding in Moore
v. Ill. Cent. R. Co."
and moreover:
"A common law or statutory action for wrongful 'discharge
differs from any remedy which the board has power to provide,
and does not involve question of future relations between the
railroads and its other employers."'17 (Emphasis added)
thus, implying that such a test might be applied to determine whether
courts have jurisdiction.
And if in handling such a case the court must consider some
provision of a collective bargaining agreement, many courts have
held that its interpretation would, of course, have no binding effect
on future interpretation by the board.18
In 1949 in the case of Clay v. Callaway9 the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a petition which
had raised the question of the power of the court to decree restoration
of Clay to his job and left it pending for trial. The trial, then, would
necessarily involve an interpretation of the collective agreement be-
tween Clay and his employer, but the court seemed to indicate that the
Moore20 case allowed Clay to prosecute his action for reinstatement
in the District Court.
Newman2' cites the Clay22 case and raises the question whether
14 Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 299 N.Y. 496, 87 N.E.2d 532 (1949).
15 Supra, n. 8.
16 Ibid.
'1 Ibid.
Is Supra, n. 4 and n. 8.
19 Clay v. Callaway, 178 F.2d 758 (1949).
20 Supra, n. 4.21 Supra, n. 10.
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SiocuM,23 which was decided after Clay,24 has proscribed all actions
in equity or whether Clay2 5 can be used as authority for the proposi-
tion that the district courts still have some original equity jurisdiction
under the Act.
The instant case was obviously the ideal opportunity for a decision
which would squarely meet the question. This writer feels that by
merely citing Slocum 26 and arguing that the plaintiff's complaint was
covered by the doctrine of that case and was not within the facts of
Moore27 the court did not adequately state the grounds for its decision.
The facts as well as the cause of action herein are clearly different
from those in Slocum.28 If the court intended to apply Slocum to
proscribe all actions in equity in this area from the jurisdiction of the
district courts, it would seem it should have said so instead of merely
straddling between Moore29 and Slocum." The bench and bar would
then have been better able to chart its future course in this area.
WILLIAM U. ZIEVRS
Discovery-Scope of Adverse Examination of Attorney-Plain-
tiff commenced an action to recover for injuries sustained as a result
of the alleged negligent operation of a bus in which she was a passen-
ger. The defendant insurance company answered separately and set
up a defense based on a condition of the insurance policy requiring
notice of the accident within a reasonable time, and denied liability,
alleging prejudice or damage as a result of the tardy notice. Two
attorneys had been retained by the insurance company to conduct an
investigation of the circumstances attending the accident. After the
issue was joined, proceedings were taken by the plaintiff for an
adverse examination of the two attorneys. At the same time, sub-
poenas were served upon them requiring them to bring enumerated
reports and documents concerning their investigation. The trial court
granted the motion of the defendant insurance company to suppress
the adverse examinations upon the ground that the information sought
to be elicited was within the attorney-client privilege. Held: Reversed.
Where the fact of investigation conducted by an attorney for his client
is a relevant issue raised by the pleadings, the attorney may be
adversely examined before trial as the agent of his client at the time of
22 Supra, n. 19.
23 Supra, n. 8.
24 Supra, n. 19.
25 Ibid.
26 Supra, n. 8.27Supra, n. 4.28Supra, n. 8.
29Supra, n. 4.
so Supra, n. 8.
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